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Generic Studies:
Their Renewed Importance in
Religious and Literary Interpretation
Mary Gerhart
ABSTRACT
In recent years, the need for a critique of "reader" as rigorous as that
which has been developed for "text" and for "author" has become
increasingly acute. Whether in the study of religion as story and biography or
in interpretative reading in general, a critical notion of reader is essential if
the act of reading is to be anything other than mere consumption of texts.
Some new way of understanding the hermeneutical circle is required to avert
the narcissism latent in the Anselmian model.
The notion of "genre" as developed by four recent theorists is helpful in
the task of constructing a critique of "reader." E. D. Hirsch, Hans-Georg
Gadamer, Tzvetdn Todorov, and Paul Ricoeur have each surpassed the
idealist notion of genre as a classificatory device and developed in its place the
notion of genre as a generative pinciple.
Todorov, for example, illustrates how "form" is a theoretical, as distinct
from a descriptive or explanatory, issue According to both Hirsch and
Todorov, somewhere between empirical details and metaphysical
thematizations lie generic formulations which can assist the reader to
organize his/her response to the text and to recognize the probable
understanding toward which the conventions of the text are directed.
In Gadamer's theory of interpretation, the notion of genre acquires
historicity. After Gadamer, genres can no longer be regarded as timeless a
priori categories Rather, because they are constituted by historical
reflections, their rise and decline are intrinsic to text-interpretation.
Finally, in Ricoeur's theory that generic considerations are correlative
principles of production and interpretation, we find a basis for understanding
genre as praxis. If we understand reading to be isomorphic to authoring, it
becomes clear that the reader can no longer be regarded as the self-evident
recipient of text-signification. Genre, in Ricoeur's theory, transforms
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"speech" into a "work" and points toward a new notion of "reader" as one
whose reconstruction of the text is the condition for the possibility of its being
a story that "gives life."
This notion of "reader" makes possible a new model of the
hermeneutical circle—one which signifies the essential roles of critical
thought which follows naive reading and of informed understanding which
follows after thought
Introduction: Need for a Critique of "Reader"
I N William Faulkner's Light in August, the main character, ReverendHightower, undergoes a major transformation when he delivers LenaGrove's child. Formerly addicted to introspection and reclusiveness,
he becomes converted to action, having become a true believer in fecundity.
This change is signified by his giving up reading Tennyson and turning instead
to Shakespeare's Henry IV. Shakespeare, he says, is "food for a
man"—ostensibly, of course, for the man he now is.
Murray Krieger uses this example in his recently published Theory of
Criticism to suggest that a reader, like Hightower, is disposed to remain
entrapped in the process of his / her own experiencing. "This reference to
literature as 'food,'" Krieger says, "suggests clearly enough the notion that a
reader matches his literary work to his prior needs, and then absorbs it into
himself, forcing it to serve his own bodily functions."
Krieger reformulates this example into a critical issue:
Are the literary works we read our teachers, shapers of our visions and
our persons, or are they reflections of our needs? Do they seize upon us
and mold us, creating for us and in us the forms that become the forms
of all our imaginations, or do we seize upon them to be what our
persons require them to be, putting them into a rude service for us? Are
we doomed only to project our own imaginative forms outward,
peopling all works with the single cast of monsters created by our own
imagination, and so turning all works into essentially the same work,
even though we persuade ourselves we are but responding to a variety
of external features whose uniformity of pattern seems to confirm our
hypothesis about them? In his hermeneutic circularity does the critic's
every claim to objectivity reduce to this charade played out by his own
personality in order to deceive—most of all—himself? (43-44)
This is not a new question. But perhaps it gains urgency in this time when
story in and of itself has come to the fore in a remarkable relationship with
religious studies. From John Dunne's biographical approach to story,
t hrough Michael Novak's utilization of story as voyage, to explicit attempts to
show how thinking is informed by story by Stephen Cntes, Giles Gunn,
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William Doty, and James Hillman in James Wiggins's Religion as Story, the
power of the metaphor of story for religious studies is manifest. Many studies
of story and religion have burgeoned within recent years and most have been
critical at the very least in the sense that they assume there are, as Carol Christ
says, "Stories That Kill and Stones That Give Life." Some studies have more
directly placed the critical element in the act of appropriation. Regardless of
how the issue is articulated, from Philip Rieffs premise that a book is dead
until a reader gives it voice to Walter Slatoff's plea for "respect for the reader,"
the critical reader is generally conceded to be the prime mover in a literary
transaction.
This is not to say, however, that the new found affinity between story and
religion is by virtue of its recent success immune to Krieger's suspicion that the
reader-critic may be indulging in self-deception. And if Krieger's way of
posing the problem is too general, Christopher Lasch levels a more specific
indictment. Lasch describes the "new narcissism" of our time and designates
the "retreat to purely personal satisfactions" as one major characteristic of the
seventies: "To live for the moment is the prevailing passion—to live for
yourself, not for your predecessors or posterity. We are fast losing the sense of
historical continuity, the sense of belonging to a succession of generations
originating in the past and stretching into the future" (5).
By calling attention to perversions of the act of reading, Krieger and
Lasch assist in the task of making explicit the principles operative in a reader's
critical appropriation of stories. On the one hand, they serve to dismiss the all
too easy counter-criticism that the growing emphasis on reader aggrandizes
the tendency toward self-absorption and narcissism. The focus on reader in
their critiques makes self-evident, and, in a sense, forces those larger contexts
of criticism which tend otherwise to remain so formal to permit, if not to
foster, narcissism. Although neither treat the issue of genre, their concerns are
clearly related to generic /1 / considerations. At the name time, however, they
implicitly demand a more sophisticated model of the hermeneutical circle / 2 /
(see Figure 1). This demand can be clarified by a pair of optical allusions.
Krieger, for example, is skeptical of the reader's ability to transcend what
seems to Krieger to be a viciousness of the hermeneutical circle (see Figure 2),
and Lasch's notion of narcissism suggests that the text is a mirror surface from
which only the reader's self-image is reflected (see Figure 3).
Initially, then, we wish to inquire how generic studies might provide one
way of emending the confines of the circle (in response to Krieger) and of
retrieving for the reader a sense of historical continuity (in response to Lasch),
without allowing the reader to retreat into historicism. More generally, we will
ask how generic studies might contribute to the task of developing a critique of
"reader" as rigorous as that which has been developed in recent years for
"text" and for "author." Our ambition here will be to show how the notion of
"genre"—as reviewed by such theorists as E. D. Hirsch, Hans-Georg
Gadamer, Tzvetan Todorov, and Paul Ricoeur—can function as a limit-
concept for the notion of "reader" and ultimately for that of self-
understanding.
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Some Recent Theories of Genre
The new view that genre is more than a principle of classification is a
relatively recent development. The Princeton Encyclopedia of Poetry and
Poetics, as late as 1965, reflects the breakdown of the classical view of genre
that has taken place in the last fifty years. Tracing the career of the word
"genre" from the time of Plato and Aristotle, G. N. G. Orsini cites the
exclusion of the lyric from almost all pre-nineteenth century studies of genre
as an example of the fickleness of generic classification. Orsini's conclusion
echoes the death knell for genre as a viable concept in criticism: "The most
radical rejection of genre in modern times was made by Croce, who considered
them mere abstractions, useful in the construction of classifications for
practical convenience, but of no value as aesthetic categories" (308). Orsini
models his notion of generic typification upon the rudimentary kind of
scientific classification and blames nineteenth century philosophy for the
prolongation of what he regards as futile categorizing: "It can be imagined to
what a riot of dialectic it led in Hegel's Aesthetic, which should have been a
warning, but acted instead as an incentive to the metaphysical aestheticians of
the nineteenth century, each with his own system of the arts and of the genre"
(308). Clearly, for Orsini and, I imagine, for most readers of this influential
handbook on literary theory, genre is defunct.
Each of the four following theorists, like Orsini, rejects the notion of
genre as mere classification. Either they assimilate classification within other
more essential functions of genre (Hirsch—determination of meaning;
Todorov—relation of single texts to others), or they attempt to go beneath
classification to some larger or more fundamental dimension of the task of
defining genre (Gadamer—history; Ricoeur—production of text).
E. D Hirsch—Genre as Constitutive Element
in Interpretation
Of the four, Hirsch's theory appears to be the most radical. For him, there
is no meaning without genre; that is, verbal meaning is always "genre-bound"
(76). In his most systematic treatment of the subject, he distinguishes between
"intrinsic genre" and "broad genre." Intrinsic genre is a "shared type that
constitutes and determines meanings," and its locus is somewhere between
"broad or traditional genre" and the particular meaning of a literary work (78-
79). Genre is entirely on the side of interpretation: the need of generic
considerations for developing a relatively stable norm of language is best seen,
Hirsch thinks, when we have misinterpreted a work. For then the reader's
faulty notion of genre, which governs his/her expectations of the particular
meanings of a work, comes to be noticed. These expectations include the
range of vocabulary and syntax, the tone of the work, the extension or
rejection of particular connotations, and the explication of the relationship
between the persona and the reader. When these expectations are frustrated or
when the results of shaping them in a certain way are jumbled, we become
aware that we have been working with a faulty generic conception.
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A good example of a text which requires almost all its readers to
experience the need to change their generic expectations is Jonathan Swift's A
Modest Proposal. In his excellent analysis of how irony functions as the
essential structure of this text, Wayne Booth notes that Swift's essay is
designed to "deceive all readers for a time" and then require them "to
recognize and cope with their deception":
Different readers will become suspicious at different points. . . But
most will have had their suspicions fully aroused by paragraph 7, and
every reader should know, by paragraph 9, that the most wrenching
kind of irony is at work. Every reader has thus to some degree been
duped—not simply for a fleeting moment of shock and reconstruction
that is produced by essays that are ironic from the first word, but for
scvcial paidgidpii!). And every reader has thus been drawn lino an
engagement of the most active kind: having been driven to suspect, and
finally to admit that the voice is speaking a kind of mad
reasonableness, one is tricked into an intensely active state. . . . (106-
09)
Not all texts, of course, demand such an abrupt generic judgment on the part
of the reader, but Hirsch's point is thereby strengthened: One of the most
difficult and central acts of interpreting a text is not only the proper
determination of its genre, but often the recognition that generic reflection is
precisely what is needed.
As many critics have pointed out, the major thrust of Hirsch's theory is
toward making authorial intention normative for the interpretation of a text,
and this part of his interpretation theory has caused critics to find his concept
of "reader" less than adequate. Nevertheless, his theory is important, it seems
to me, especially for two reasons. First, he has made genre into a principle of
meaning: no genre, no meaning. Genre is not to be, understood as an
overriding generalization under which individual texts or statements are
subsumed. On the contrary, the origin of any text is mixed and multiple. That
is why the notion of genre is hidden at the beginning of the interpretation of
any given text, according to Hirsch: "the details of the utterances are not
present to consciousness all at once" (79). Yet by means of generic
consideration, we come to know the range of possible fulfillments and to
recognize the probable understanding toward which the conventions of the
text are directed. Krieger, for example, cites the Prologue to Henry IVas an
instance of need for the reader to distinguish between the broad genres of
history and of poetry. Read as history, the Prologue will tempt the reader to
utilize one or another cause-and-effect model. Read as poetry, the Prologue
will lead the reader to "transform the usual meanings of the text from the
chronological to the logical" and to "follow the clues of internal relations." In
short, reading the Prologue as poetry, the reader reconstructs the historical
facts into "elements that are anything but random for those who have been
taught to disentangle and relate them in more ways than their casual before-
ness and after-ness would suggest" (156-57).
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Hirsch's second contribution consists in his classification of the process
by which generic considerations lead us to anticipate the wider implications of
individual texts. Through the process of discovering the intrinsic genre of a
work, we become aware of the "concentrated and symbolizing conventions of
the genre itself (97). Now, Hirsch himself, in classifying genre as & principle of
interpretation, has less regard for these "wider implications," treating them
instead as provisional and descriptive. And so we will turn to another theorist,
Hans-Georg Gadamer, for whom historicity of understanding achieves the
status of a principle of interpretation.
Hans-Georg Gadamer—Genre as Historicity
Gadamer wishes to make explicit the prejudgments and foremeanings
with which every interpreter comes to a text. For him, absolute neutrality with
respect to any text is an impossibility. Interpretation, on the contrary, is "the
conscious assimilation of one's own foremeanings and prejudices" (238).
Hirsch locates the historicity of genre in the relationship of intrinsic genre to
"broader genre ideas"—which conventions, he says, are important only
heuristically in arriving at the intrinsic genre. Gadamer—emphasizing the
inescapable ness of the historical—explicates how it is constitutive of the way
reflection constantly understands and exercises itself.
Gadamer does this by exploring the various modes of "being historical."
The "classical," for example, illustrates the historical process of preservation.
The importance of the classical is in the fact that "its historical domain
precedes all historical reflection and continues through it" (225). In other
words, the classical is a foremeaning. This foremeaning is most clear in the
sense we sometimes have, in reading texts or in viewing art, of being rescued
from the immediate present for the sake of the enduring, the significance that
can't be lost, which is understood in relation to all past and future significance
as well.
When we examine classics—those texts which "through the constant
proving of themselves" set before us something we recognize as true to our
own experience—we notice that they are always representatives of literary
genres. Ulvsses, The Rape of the Lock, the Iliad, for example, are all known to
us as a novel, a mock epic, a classical epic respectively. In fact, classics become
classics when, after a stylistic ideal is perceived as having been fulfilled at a
certain place and time, we become aware of the decline and distance in
subsequent works. In this sense, classics are climaxes that articulate "the
history of the genre in terms of before and after." Gadamer emphasizes that
the climactic points of a genre usually come within a brief period of time.
Although genre is therefore history-bound (much more than literary critics
usually acknowledge), it is its own uprooting. For as it endures, the classic
generates an element of self-criticism- "the classical is what is preserved
precisely because it signifies and interprets itself (Gadamer- 257). That is, the
classic is not merely a statement about the past, a witness to what still needs
interpretation, but is a communication with the present, a communication
which overcomes its own historical distance
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From Gadamer, then, we obtain a refinement of the broad general notion
of genre which Hirsch merely tolerates, namely, of its historicity. Both wish to
get beyond genre as a merely historical species through which all other
members are defined and to which they are subsumed. Gadamer's point is that
interpretation is best understood, not so much as an act of subjectivizing as
"the placing of oneself within a process of tradition, in which past and present
are constantly fused" (258).
While Gadamer does clarify the historical status of genre, the heuristic
function of genre in interpretation remains largely unexplored in his theory.
For this, we turn to Tzvetan Todorov.
Genre as a Second-Order Reality—Tzvetan Todorov
hrom I odorov, we learn to differentiate genre from descriptive and
explanatory accounts of the meaningfulness of texts. In his theory, genre is a
"principle operative in a number of texts, rather than what is specific about
each of them" (3). First of all, he posits a distance between a genre and an
individual work. He insists that the notion of structure is not to be understood
as referring to an empirical reality but to a model constructed according to
that reality. What he helps us to understand is an epistemological issue, which
tends to be overlooked in previous generic studies. That is, the structure which
comes to light in a proper generic study does not claim to reproduce the
experience involved in writing or in reading the book. What it does is to
provide a representation, a cluster of meanings—a model constructed after
the understanding of the reality. A model provides a context for
communicating what goes beyond the particular constitutive meanings of a
text. To go from knowledge of a genre to the structure of a given work is not to
impose meaning upon the empirical reality of a text, but to incur the original
process of arriving at a genre, that is, of distancing, abstracting, or
generalizing from the particular. In Todorov's theory, there is no necessity
that any given work embody its genre—only a probability. But we might add:
If the genre has been carefully constructed there is a true probability that a text
will be enhanced by being considered in the light of generic propositions.
In the long run, a genre cannot, strictly speaking, be invalidated by a
single instance. Fmnegans Wake, for example, although a recognized novel,
has plagued critics since it was published with respect to the way it relates to
that genre. What generic considerations do admirably well is to call forth
rigorous reflection on the complex factors which make individual works
successful or not From Todorov, we learn to expect that the empirical reality
of a particular text bears many possible relationships to the generic hypothesis
which helps us to organize our response to that work. In this sense, generic
considerations force us to formulate our own notion of the informing
principle of texts which we might otherwise leave at the level of vague
enjoyment or unexamined antipathy.
Now the distinction that Todorov makes between a description of details
of individual texts and an organizing principle—which, precisely because it is
of an order different from the empirical reality, enables us to take distance
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from our immediate experience of the text—has important implications for
the self-understanding of the reader. We turn finally to Paul Ricoeur for
assistance in drawing out these implications.
Paul Ricoeur—Genre as Praxis
Ricoeur makes two important contributions to the foregoing discussion
of genre. The first is his notion of genre as a means of production. In his view,
genres produce discourse as a work: "to master a genre is to master a
'competence' which offers practical guidelines for 'performing' an individual
work" (1973:135). In other words, by means of genre, the author's discourse
becomes a public phenomenon. Genre keeps the author's discourse open for
"fresh interpretations in new situations" (1973:137), and preserves it from
distortions.
Ricoeur compares the generative function of grammar, as demonstrated
by Noam Chomsky, with the generative function of literary genres: Their
function "is to mediate between speaker and hearer by establishing a common
dynamics capable of ruling both the production of discourse as a work of a
certain kind and its interpretation according to the rules provided by the
genre" (1973:136). The important point for our discussion is that the
"dynamics of form" is simultaneously a "dynamics of thought." That is, the
meaning-oriented content itself is produced at the same level as the
corresponding principles of literary genre. The coordination of the "dynamics
of form" and "dynamics of thought" can be seen in recent studies of explicitly
and classically "religious" genres, such as Dominic Crossan's structural
approach to parable. Differentiating story in parable from story in myth, in
apologue, in action, and in satire, he relates story to "our necessary fascination
with brinks and borders, with edges and limits" (Crossan: 18). More careful
attention to the process of coordinating the dynamics of form and thought
would seem to be needed for studies of more complex contemporary types as
well.
Ricoeur's second contribution is his extension of the notion of "work" to
both author and reader. For him a "work" is constituted by composition (that
is, genre) and individual style: "Even the term Vork' reveals the nature of
these new categories, which are those of production and of labor. To impose a
form upon material, to subject a production to genres, and to produce an
individual style are ways of considering language as a material to be worked
and formed. They are the ways in which discourse becomes the object of a
praxis . . ." (1973:134). He concludes, "The same competence in the reader
[which comes from having mastered a genre] helps him perform the
corresponding operations of interpretation" (1973:135).
From Ricoeur, we are able to transpose the notion of author from one
who speaks to one whose work produces something individual. By this
transposition, the category of author can be seen to be as much in need of
interpretation as the work produced since the author is no longer the self-
evident signifier in a particular discourse. Similarly, we can transpose the
notion of reader from one who listens to one whose interpretation produces
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something individual. By this transposition, the category of reader can be seen
to be as much in need of interpretation as the work produced. No longer is the
reader the self-evident recipient of the signifier in a particular discourse.
How might Ricoeur's notion of genre as praxis assist our understanding
of a critical reader of a body of texts formally treated as a broad genre? If we
apply this question to the "Catholic novel tradition," for example, we first of
all notice that the classical definition of this tradition has always, implicitly at
least, required the orthodoxy of the author. This requirement can best be seen
in attempts—some anxious, some defiant—to exonerate authors from their
unorthodox inclinations. However, among major novelists treating of
cultural, doctrinal or moral matters pertinent to Catholicism are not only
"native" Catholics and converts to Catholicism but also "secessionists" such
as James Joyce, perhaps the most prominent innovator in the contemporary
novel.
Ricoeur's notion of the reader as having the competence to master a genre
allows us to reaffirm with more intelligibility than before that other than
apologetic intentions can inform the studies of texts informed by Catholicism.
Moreover, several problems of readership come clearly into focus: Some
novels like Portrait of the Artist or Fmnegans Wake have received only
primitive religious readings because they have been based on the novelist's
posture toward orthodox doctrine. "A Man of Scrupulous Meanness," the
title of a not atypical religious interpretation of James Joyce's novels,
illustrates this point. Other, more recent novels, such as Group Portrait with
Lady by the Nobel prize recipient, Heinrich Boll, have received little or no
assessment of their religious import. In these novels, institutional religion is
regarded with irony, ritual and sacrament are seemingly impotent, and the
corporate desire for a sacred edge to the everyday remains unfulfilled. The
problem for the critical reader becomes one of interpreting the disillusionment
or the passionate rejection of traditional religion which rejection has become a
prevailing mode of enlightenment. Still other novels—those informed most
straightforwardly by Catholicism, such as Kristin Lavransdatter by the Nobel
prize recipient Sigrid Undset, and Graham Greene's Honorary
Counsel—may offer even greater challenges to the critical reader because the
revelational forces which once validated them as religious now appear to be
exhausted.
Together with Ricoeur's notion of praxis, Hirsch's notion of the
"multiple parentage" of intrinsic genre is highly appropos for an
interpretation of the Catholic novel which would attempt to achieve both a
hermeneutics of suspicion and of restoration. Todorov's distinction between
informing principle and detail analysis allows us to utilize other than the
orthodox model of belief to understand the thought informing the novels / 3 /.
Gadamer's recognition of the short life span of particular genres, too, makes it
possible to enter into generic considerations with the anticipation of change
rather than with a singular dread of decline. Gadamer's insistence that the rise
and decline of a particular genre be part of generic study also opens the way
for the notion of the dialectics of belief: on one level, the dialectics among
seemingly opposed representations of belief, such as in Kristin Lavransdatter
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and Finnegans Wake; on another more basic level the dialectic between the
experience of belief and its expression by the reader, which takes place in every
literary transaction. On both levels, the reformulation of belief takes place
within the reader according to the way the text affords a distantiation from
his/her habitual beliefs.
Conclusion—A New Hermeneutic Model
We are now ready to begin to construct a model for the critical reader in
the light of the preceding generic considerations. What characterizes the ideal
reader? The hermeneutics of suspicion fashioned by Nietzsche, Freud and
Marx, has already demythologized the notion of the reader as standing
objectively disengaged from the work. Aesthetic distance has had to make
room for aesthetic immanence (Lang: 133-68). But we have not had, it seems
to me, a model for a reader who is both engaged with a particular work and
knowledgeable of the succession of forms which can be seen to inform it.
I have tried to show that it is by means of generic considerations that the
knowledgeable reader becomes the critical reader who is in turn capable of
questioning how these forms and expressions undergo revision and mutual
refinement in the text. In our study of genre, we began to see in Hirsch the
notion that generic considerations are essential to a good interpretation of a
text. In Gadamer, we moved to broad historical considerations, as they
precede and prolong the individual text. In Todorov, we differentiated
between the theoretical character of genre and the descriptive character of
detail analysis. Finally, in Ricoeur, we understood genre as transforming
speech into a "work," and bringing about a new notion of "reader."
To satisfy the foregoing exigencies of genre, the critical reader proceeds
from naive questions about the text to critical questions of its historicity, its
structure, its informing principle and finally through to the most difficult
question of all—that of the reader's self-understanding as reflected in his/ her
understanding of the text. We might say that the understanding of the text is
refracted by means of these questions. But these refractions are held together
in a new and more complex hermeneutical model (see Figure 4).
In this model, the reader's observations are expected to be more or less
diffuse during a first reading and become progressively focused as they reach
what is known in the theory of optics as the "circle of least confusion,"that is,
the smallest possible image. Paradoxically, this is the site at which, in a perfect
lens, light comes to a point. However, the lens always has aberrations in
texture and in quality, causing, for example, minute differences in the angles
of refraction and subtle differences in the reflected rays of color. Although
light never comes to a "perfect" point, it can be said to constitute at that point
an apex analogous, perhaps, to the irreducibly individual reader In this
model, the circles are not isolated entities, such as is suggested by the
traditional notion of the hermeneutical circle. Rather, in the three-
dimensional model, each hypothetical circle is only a part of the process of
interpretation, and the individual reader is situated as the ultimately
indecipherable agent of that process, both acted upon and acting.
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No longer vicious, the hermeneutical circle now signifies the essential
roles of critical thought after naive reading and of informed understanding
after thought. Becoming "informed" by raising generic and other questions,
the reader's understanding is made capable of being continually
"transformed" insofar as he/she voices the fullness of meaning always
represented by the text. The challenge, then, lies with the reader whose
reconstruction of the text is the condition for the possibility of its being a story
that "gives life."
NOTES
/1 / The adjectival form of "genre." Here I am following the usage of theorists
discussed later in this paper. See the OED for the relationship between "genre" and
"generate."
/ 2/ There are, of course, several "versions" of the hermeneutical circle. Perhaps
the earliest is the Anselmian "Believe in order to understand; understand in order to
believe," and one of the most innovative is Paul Ricoeur's early formulation, "The
symbol gives rise to thought; thought is informed by symbol." A theorist's conception
of the hermeneutical circle is often a touchstone to the development of his/her
thought. Ricoeur, for example, in The Conflict of Interpretations, later sees the need to
move away from a "too psychological" understanding of the hermeneutical circle: "For
behind believing there is the primacy of the object of faith over faith; and behind
understanding there is the primacy of exegesis and its method over the naive reading of
the text. This means that the genuine hermeneutic circle is not psychological but
methodological. It is the circle constituted by the object that regulates faith and the
method that regulates understanding. There is a circle because the exegete is not his
own master" (1974:389). For Hirsch, on the other hand, the hermeneutical circle is
essentially the relation of the whole to parts of the text
Bernard Lonergan acknowledges that the hermeneutic circle is only "logically a
circle since coming to understand is not a logical deduction " Essentially, it is a "self-
correcting process of learning that spirals into the meaning of the whole by using each
new part to fill out and qualify and correct the understanding reached in reading the
earlier parts" (159)
Some of my colleagues, emphasizing the need for radically new perspectives,
speak of the need to "break" the hermeneutic circle It remains to be seen in what sense
the model I suggest at the end of this paper might represent both the self-correcting
process and the need to "break" the circle
/ 3 / See, for example, four other models delineated recently by David Tracy the
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322 Mary Gerhart
Figure 1: Traditional model of the hermeneutical circle. Ideally,
understanding gives rise to belief, and belief is always informed by
understanding.
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Figure 2: Krieger's notion of the hermeneutical circle. The traditional model is





Figure 3: Lasch's notion of the hermeneutical circle. The traditional model, no




Figure 4: In the three-dimensional model, the hermeneutical circle becomes a
cone. The model illustrates how the reader's belief and understanding are
focused through generic and other considerations in the critical process. That
is, the hermeneutical circle is articulated in a series of different terms and
contracts as the text is appropriated by the reader. In the traditional model,
the reader is implicit. In the three-dimensional model, the reader becomes
explicit at the apex of the process as he / she interprets and is interpreted by the
text.
